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Chapter 5
Collateral Recovery and Non-Performing
Loans: Impact, Appropriateness and Necessity
of Harmonisation
Ben Schuijling*
Vincent Van Hoof
Tom Hutten*
1 Introduction'
The European legislator intends to partially harmonise the extrajudicial
enforcement of collateral. These plans have been laid down in a legislative proposal
titled 'Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the council on
credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral'.2 The cause of
the proposed harmonisation is the intention to tackle so called Non-Perfonning
Loans (NPLs).
The financial crisis of the last decade has led to an increase of debtors who are
unable to make the scheduled payments to cover interest or capital reimbursements
to their bank, in particular in southern Europe.3 A large amount of NPLs is
considered to hamper credit granting in general and to threaten the stability of the
financial system as a whole. The European legislator therefore aims to reduce the
current stocks ofNPLs and to prevent any excessive build-up in the future. One of
the proposed measures is a common framework for accelerated and extrajudicial
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enforcement of collateral.4 The introduction of a common framework for collateral
enforcement issupposed to help banks to better deal with loans once these become
non-performing, by improving the conditions under which they can enforce their
collateral. Furthermore, the shorter time for enforcement and the bigger proceeds
that are to be expected, should increase the value ofNPLs in the secondary market.5
2 Background
2. 1 NPLs and their Effects
The last financial crisis and the following recessions left a number of European
banks with high levels of NPLs. NPLs are (bank) loans where the borrower is
unable to make the scheduled payments to cover interest or capital reimbursements.
When the payments are more than 90 days past due, or the loan is assessed as
unlikely to be repaid by the borrower, the loan is classified as an NPL.6 In 2015, a
total of 1066 billion ofnon-performing loans were listed on thebalance sheets of
banks in the Eurozone.7 A large quantity ofNPLs on the balance sheet of a bank
is considered etrimental. NPLs reduce bank's profitability because they require
higher levels of provisioning. Subsequently, banks cannot use this regulatory
capital to issue new profitable loans to businesses and consumers. Furthermore,
management and active recovery ofNPLs tie up significant amounts of a bank's
human and financial resources. Altogether, NPLs hurt the bank's solvability and
reduce the bank's capacity to lend, and have a negative ffect on the economic
growth and the stability of the financial system.8
1.2 European Dimension
The percentages of loans that are non-perfonning vary greatly, when seen from a
member state level." In some Member States, the NPL ratio is only 2%, whereas in
other Member States almosthalfofthe outstanding loans and advances are classified
as NPLs. A decrease is apparent across the EU since 2015.10 Nevertheless, a few
Member States still stmggle with high rates." Some banks in these Member States
have been unable to significantly reduce the level ofNPLs on their balance sheet.12
Because of the risks NPLs pose on the stability of the financial system and because
of their negative ffect on economic growth, the European Commission launched
a European strategy forNPLs in May 2017.13 Subsequently, the ECOFIN Council
agreed on an Action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe in July 2017 H
The plan calls upon various institutions, among which the Commission, to take
measures addressing the risks related to high NPL ratios in Europe. In the plan it
is stressed that he primary responsibility for tackling high NPL ratios is with the
affected banks. However, because of the economic spill over effects caused by
the interconnectedness of national banking and financial systems - both in terms
of economic growth and in tenns of financial stability - the Commission calls for
Europe-wide action.
In line with the Council's (ECOFIN) plan, the Commission presented a mix of
complementary policy actions in March 2018.15 To facilitate the management
ofNPLs by banks and avoid the accumulation of new NPLs in the future, they
presented (i) a proposal for a regulation amending the capital requirement regulation
and introducing common minimum coverage levels for newly originated loans
4 Other policy action areas are bank supervision and regulation, developing secondary markets for distressed assets,
and fostering restmcturing of the banking system. Furthermore, the European Commission issued a (non-binding)
blueprint for how national Asset Management Companies or other measures can be set up in compliance with
existing EU banking and State aid roles. These AMCs can be set up to buy NPLs. For an overview of the policy
measures, see COM (2018) 766: Third Progress Report on the reduction ofnon-performing loans and further isk
reduction in the Banking Union.
5 See COM(2018) 766 (n4) pt. 6 and 7 ofthe preamble.
6 See Directive Proposal (n 2) 1. This is in line with (he EBA Draft Guidelines on management of non-performing
and forborne exposures, which refers to Annex V of Regulation (EU) 680/2014: https://eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/2150622/Consultation+Paper4-on+Guidelines+on+management+of+non-perfbnning+and+fo
rbome+exposures+%28EBA-CP-2018-01%29.pdf.
7 See Supervisory Banking Statistics; https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/.
8 For fiuther reading, see: IMF staff discussion note, A Strategy for Resolving Europe's Problem Loans (Sept.
2015):https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdnl519.pdf
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9 See fee latest Supervisory Banking Statistics (Q3 2018), T04.02.2 Asset quality, non-performing loans and advances
by'country (p. 60) http's://www^bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.supervisorybankmgstatistics_
third_quarter_2018_201901.en.pdf.
10 In 20~15, the total ofNPLs on the balance sheets of European Banks was  1066 billion; in the third quarter of 2018
(he total was  627 billion.
11 Member States that are struggling with high NPL rates are Greece (43,36%), Cyprus (20,68%), Portugal
(14,54%). For a brief understanding see: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artides/2018-02-14/get-a-grip-on-
europe-s-bad-loan-problem-with-fhese-five-charts.
12 See "in this context: ECB, Guidance to banks on non-performing loans (March 2017) (https://www.
bankmgsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdeguidance_on_npl.en.pdf).
13 Reflection paper on the deepening of the economic md monetary union, 31 May 2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/publications/reflection-paper-deepenmg-economic-and-monetary-union_en).
14 See www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/press/press-releases/2017/07/l 1/conclusions-non-performing-loans/.
15 See COM (2018) 133 - SWD(2018) 72: Second Progress Report on the Reduction of Non-Perfonning Loans in
Europe (htq)s://eur-lex.europa^uAegal-contenVEN/TXT/PDF/?uri-CELEX:52018DC0133&from-EN) See also
COM (2018) 37 - SWD (2018) 33: First Progress Report on the Reduction ofNoa-Performmg Loans in Europe.
(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-conten N/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018SC0033R(01)&&om=EN).
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that become non-performing,16 (ii) a proposal for a directive on credit servicers,
credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral,17 and (iii) a Commission services'
staff working document containing a blueprint on the set-up of national asset
management companies (AMCs).18
The Commission believes debt restructuring, insolvency and debt recovery
processes are too slow and unpredictable in some Member States. This sentiment
is supported by a 2017 report of the subgroup of the Council's Financial Services
Committee on NPLs, which concludes that there is a lack of predictability of
insolvency, foreclosure and judicial frameworks.19 Therefore, the Commission
wishes to facilitate debt recovery by enabling accelerated out-of-court enforcement
of loans seciired by collateral.20 This would help secured creditors to recover value
from collateral without going to court.21
3 Proposal for Accelerated Extrajudicial CoUateral Enforcement
3. 1 Introduction
Title V of the Proposal for a directive on credit servicers, credit purchasers and
the recovery of collateral contains measures regarding Accelerated Extrajudicial
Collateral Enforcement (AECE).22 Under the proposals. Member States have to
ensure that creditors and debtors will be able to agree in advance on an accelerated
mechanism to recover the value from loans guaranteed with collateral. Member
States are obligated to have a legal framework in place for at least one way of
enforcement trough public auction, private sale or appropriation.23 The proposal
sets out in detail which rights should be ensured.
The proposed AECE mechanisms are limited in scope to loans granted to
businesses. Consumer loans (including mortgage-backed loans) are excluded,
because of the potential social impact that accelerated extrajudicial collateral
enforcement could have. This exclusion has its basis in the public consultation
laimched in July 201724 and is consistent with the action plan as presented by the
ECOFIN Council.25
3.2 Proposal in General
In short, the AECE method must be agreed upon upfront between the creditor
and the debtor in writing or in a notarised format.26 The agreement comprises a
directly enforceable title, so the creditor can be spared going to court.27 When
the debtor defaults on the loan, the creditor has to grant he debtor a reasonable
period of time to make the due payments and avert enforcement.28 The creditor
who proceeds in enforcing its collateral, will need to have the collateral valued
prior to enforcement. Furthermore, the creditor is obliged to notify the debtor four
weeks prior to the enforcement of his intention to realise the collateral, the type of
enforcement, he time period for the execution, and the outstanding debt.29 After
the sale, the creditor only gets to keep the proceeds to the extent necessary to cover
the outstanding amounts on the loan. Excess proceeds are paid out to the creditor.30
The mandatory valuation of the collateral must comply with certain mles. Firstly,
the debtor and the creditor have to agree on the valuer to be appointed. Secondly,
the valuation has to be conducted by an independent valuer. In case the creditor
and the debtor cannot agree upon the appointment of a valuer, a valuer shall be
appointed by a judicial court.31 Thirdly, the valuation has to be fair and realistic.
Fourthly, the valuation has to be conducted specifically for the puqioses of
the realisation of the collateral after the enforcement event. Lastly, the debtor
16 See Proposal for a Regulation of the Europem Parliament and offhe Council on amending Regulation (EU)
No 575/2013 as regards minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures COM/2018/0134 final -
2018/060 (COD).
17 See Directive Proposal (n 2).
18 See COM (2018) 133 Commission staff working document AMC Blueprint.
19 Report dated 31 May 2017 of the FSC Subgroup on Non-Performing Loans, par. 4.2.4, pt. 152 (https://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9854-2017-NIT/en/pdf).
20 NPL ratios tend to be lower in Member States where collateral foreclosure periods are shorter. Another benefit of
facilitating debt recovery is that ax payers will be spared from bearing the costs of reducing NPLs.
21 The Commission also wishes to foster the transparency on NPLs in Europe by improving the data availability
and comparability as regards NPLs, and potentially supporting the development by market participants ofNPL
infonnation platforms or credit registers. These policy objectives are in line with pt. 7.1 of the Report d.d.
31 may 2017 of the FSC Subgroup on Non-Performing Loans (https://<iata.consilium.europa.eu/doc/documenV
ST-9854-2017-INIT/en/pdf).
22 See Directive Proposal (n 2) art 23-33..
23 idem, art. 24 (2) and (3).
24 The transfer of loans to a non-bank after all can be governed by a complex legal framework, which is enshrined
in national civil law and therefore unlikely to be resolved through a legislative initiative at Union level.
25 See Action Plan on the Reduction of Non-Performing Loans in Europe (https://www.consilium.euTOpa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2017/07/11/conclusions-non-performing-loans/pdf). The ECOFIN meeting took place on 20
November 2017 with the Commission services FISMA and JUST. Furthemiore, the expert group considered it
favourable to minimise the impact on Member States' private and public laws, including property law, registration
rules to transfer property rights or/and to constitute security rights, and insolvency law.
26 See Directive Proposal (n 2) art. 23 (1).
27 See Directive Proposal (n 2) art. 23 (1) and pt 46 of the preamble.
28 See Directive Proposal (n 2) art. 23 (3). The Directive Proposal leaves undefined how long this period
(approximately) is. In the preamble (he only reference made to this period, cm be found in pt 45.
29 See Directive Proposal (n 2) art 23 (1), where it is stated that he creditor and the debtor can agree on a longer
notify period.
30 See Directive Proposal (n 2) art 29.
31 idem, ait 24 (5).
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has to have the right o challenge the valuation before a court.32 If one of the
aforementioned mles are not complied with, the debtor must have the right o go
to court and challenge the use of the AECE mechanism.33
3. 3 Public Auction, Private Sale or Appropriation
The proposed irective obliges the Member States to have a mechanism in place
for enforcement through either public auction, or private sale or appropriation. If
a Member State wishes to provide for AECE by way of public auction, it should
ensure that:34
(a) the creditor has to publicly communicate the time and place of the public
auction at least 10 days prior to that auction;
(b) the creditor is obliged to make reasonable fforts to attract he highest number
of potential buyers;
(c) the creditor has to notify the debtor and any third party with an interest in or
right o the asset, of the public auction, including its time and place, at least 10
days prior to that auction;
(d) a valuation of the asset has to be conducted prior to the public auction;
(e) the reserve price of the asset has to be at least equal to the valuation amount
determined prior to the public auction;
(f) the asset can only be sold at a reduction of no more than 20% of the valuation
amount where both of the following apply:
i. no buyer has made an offer in line with the requirements referred to in
points (e) and (f) at the public auction;
ii. there is a threat of imminent deterioration of the asset.
If the Member State wishes to provide for AECE by way of private sale, it should
ensure that:35
(a) the creditor is obliged to make reasonable efforts, including adequate public
advertising, to attract potential buyers;
(b) the creditor has to notify the debtor, and any relevant hird party with an
interest in or right o the asset, of its intention to sell the asset at least 10 days
prior to offering the asset for sale;
(c) a valuation of the asset has been conducted prior to the private sale, and or a
correctly notified public auction;
(d) the guide price of the asset has to be at least equal to the amount established
in the valuation, at the time of offering the asset for private sale;
(e) the asset can only be sold at a reduction of no more than 20% of value where
both of the following apply:
i. no buyer has made an offer in line with the aforementioned requirements
within 30 days;
ii. there is a threat of imminent deterioration of the asset.
AECE by way of appropriation is a third way of collateral enforcement a Member
State can choose to facilitate. This way of enforcement is unfortunately not
immediately apparent from the text of the proposed irective. Therefore, at first
sight one can doubt whether appropriation is an independent way of collateral
enforcement. After all, article 24 section 2 states that Member States hall provide
for 'one or both' of the following means, and then lists public auction and private
sale. That appropriation isa third way of enforcement, follows from the third
section of article 24 read in conjunction with the preamble. Appropriation isclearly
summed up in point 47 of the preamble as an admissible way ofAECE under the
proposed directive. The example in point 48 of the preamble, confirms this view.36
In cases ofAECE by way of appropriation Member States have to ensure that a
creditor is obliged to pay the debtor the positive difference between the secured
outstanding debt and the (previous) valuation of the asset, if present.37
In conclusion, each of the proposed AECE regimes requires a valuation of the
assets by an independent valuer. The valuer can be agreed on by the parties or, if
parties cannot agree on a valuer, appointed by the court.38 In each case, the creditor
has to notify the debtor, and any relevant third party with an interest in or right o
the asset, of its intention to sell the asset at least 10 days prior to offering the asset
32 idem, art 24(4).
33 idem. art 281.
34 idem,art25.
35 idem, art 26.
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36 It also follows from art 33 (2) under b of the Directive Proposal and the detailed explanation of the specific
provisions of the proposal on p. 16.
37 See Directive Proposal (n 2) art 24 (3).
38 idem, art 24 (4) and (5).
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for public auction or private sale.39 The creditor has to publicly advertise the sale,
strangely enough even if it is a private sale.40 The asset cannot be sold under the
reserve price, which is 80 per cent of the valuation amount.41 The AECE by means
of appropriation obliges the creditor to repay the debtor the difference between the
sum outstanding of the secured credit agreement and the valuation of the asset.42
4 Impact on National Secured Transactions Law
4. 1 Impact Assessment and Benchmarking Exercises
Both before and after the introduction of the directive proposal, the Commission
undertook benchmarking exercises of loan enforcement regimes to establish a
reliable picture of the delays and value-recovery banks experience when faced
with creditors' defaults. It invited close cooperation from Member States and
supervisors to develop a sound and significant benchmarking methodology.43
These exercises covered various types of enforcement procedures available under
national law, including both individual and collective procedures, and available to
both secured and unsecured creditors.
In line with these benchmarking exercises, the impact of title V of the directive
proposal is assessed in the next paragraphs. It was chosen to highlight the potential
impact he proposed directive has on the national private laws of the Netherlands,
Belgium, France, Germany and Austria. Banks in these Member-States seem to
experience relatively few problems with regard to NPLs. It is therefore interesting
to examine the compatibility of the proposed directive with those national aws,
and to reflect on its possible consequences in light of the objectives of the proposal.
4.2 Netherlands
Dutch law recognises pledge (pandrechf) as a security right in movables. A
distinction is made between a possessory pledge, which requires the pledgee
39 idem, art. 25 (1) sub a.
40 idem, art 25(1) sub a and 26(1) sub a..
41 idem, art 25 (1) sub f and 26 (1) sub e.
42 idem, art 24 (3).
43 Progress on the benchmarking exercise was presented to and discussed with Member States experts at the
September and December 2017 meetings of the expert group on NPLs, including the issue of lack of access
to meaningful data. See https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9854-2017-INIT/en/pdf. Also note
that he Commission proposal for a Directive on business insolvency, restructuring and second chance lays
down obligations on Member States to collect comparable data on insolvency and restructuring proceedings and
communicate itto the Commission See Proposal for a Directive on restmcturing, second chance and ef&ciency
of insolvency (COM/2016/0723 - 2016/0359 (COD).
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to gain control over the movable, and a non-possessory pledge, which does not
require a transfer of control.
The Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek; BW) ah-eady allows for an accelerated
extrajudicial collateral enforcement with regard to a right of pledge. If the debtor
is in default (yerzuim) the pledgee has the right o sell the movable, without prior
court approval.44 The sale is in principle a public sale.45 The sale must be organised
by a notary public or a bailiff.46 If the pledge is non-possessory the pledgee can
demand the surrender of the movable as soon as the pledger or the debtor fails
to meet its obligations or the pledgee has good reason to believe they will fail to
do so.47 If the pledger efuses to surrender the movable the pledgee can seize the
movable with the assistance of a bailiff. This seizure requires the prior approval of
the court, unless the deed of pledge was executed in a notarised fonn.48 However,
the pledgee can request he court for permission to sell the movable privately.49
The pledger and pledgee can also agree on a different way of execution of the
movable, like a private sale.50 However, such an agreement can only be made if
the debtor is in default in relation to the secured obligation.
Dutch law does not allow for execution through appropriation.51 However, the
pledger and pledgee can agree that the pledger shall retain movable towards
satisfaction of the secured claim, provided that he debtor is in default.52 It is not
possible to agree on an enforcement mechanism through appropriation before the
debtor is in default.
The pledgee who wishes to enforce its security right has to communicate, to the
extent possible, the place and time of the sale to the pledger and the debtor (and
any other third party with an interest in the asset) at least three days before the
sale, unless agreed otherwise." The pledger has to communicate in writing.54 In
practice the application of the rule is excluded between the parties. Moreover, it is
not required that he pledger publicly communicates his intent o sell the movable.
44 Art 3:248 BW.
45 Art 3:250 BW.
46 Art 1 Wet ambtelijk toezicht bij openbare verkopingen.
47 Art 3:237 (3) BW.
48 Art 496 Wetboek van Burgeriijke Rechtsvordering (Code of Civil procedure).
49 Art 3:251 (1)BW.
50 Art 3:251 (2) BW.
51 Art 3:235 BW.
52 Art 3:251 (2) BW.
53 Art 3:249 (1) BW.
54 Art 1 Besluit ex artikel 249 Boek 3 Burgeriijk Wetboek, Stb. 1991,433.
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The pledgee is not required to conduct a valuation prior to the sale of the movable.
From this follows that there are no mles on reserve or guide prices for the sale
of the movable. The pledger or the debtor can challenge the enforcement of the
pledge in a summary proceeding before the court where the defendant resides, or
the court that they agreed upon.
Security over immovables in granted in the form of a mortgage (hypotheek).
This right can be enforced extrajudicially by way of a public (internet) sale in the
presence of a notary if the debtor is in default.55 A private sale is only possible with
the approval of the court.56 There are no other ways of realising the collateral, such
as through a pre-agreed appropriation of the immovable.57
The public sale of the immovable has to be notified to the debtor (and other parties
with a registered interest in the immovable) by means of a writ.58 Within fourteen
days the notary will set a time and place for the sale and he shall communicate this
to, among others, the debtor and the mortgagee.59 The public sale can be carried
out thirty days after it has been announced on one or more publicly accessible
websites.60 The mortgagee is, however, not required to conduct a valuation prior
to the sale.
4. 3 Belgium
Belgian law recognises pledge (pand) as a security right in movables. In 2018,
the so-called Pledge Act (Pandwet) updated the Belgian civil code with regard to
pledges. A distinction is made between a possessory pledge, which requires the
pledgee to gain control over the movables, and a non-possessory pledge, which
requires a public registration in a newly created Pledge Register. With regard to
immovables, Belgium recognises the creation of a mortgage (hypotheek), which
requires the registration of the mortgage deed in a public register.61 The Belgian
mortgage is enforced by a court supervised sale of the mortgaged property.62 So
there is no extrajudicial enforcement of immovables.63
55 Art 3:268(1) BW.
56 Art 3:268(2) BW and art 548 Code of Civil Procedure.
57 Cf. art3:268(5)BW.
58 Art 3:268(4) BWjo. art 544 Code of Civil Procedure.
59 Art 515 Code of Civil Procedure.
60 Art516CodeofCivil Procedure.
61 Art 76 Hypotheekwet (or Book III, title XVDI of the Belgian Civil Code).
62 Art 1563 Ger.W.; art 1626 Ger.W.
63 The mortgagee can start the sale without prior court approval if the secured claim is established by the
mortgage deed. See: Cass. (Iste Kamer) 17 november 1988, Pas. 1988,1, 303. Cf. Voorrechten en hypotheken,
Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Capita selecta, vol I, para 1-59
(April 2006).
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The updated Belgian Civil code already allows for various types of accelerated
extrajudicial collateral enforcement regarding movables.64 If the debtor is in
default, he pledgee has the right o sell or rent out part of or all the pledged assets,
so without prior court approval.65 The sale can be a public sale or private sale.66
The pledgee can order a bailiff to carry out the sale of the pledged assets.67 The
pledger and pledgee can agree on the specifics of the execution at the time of the
conclusion of the pledge contract or afterwards. The creditor must give the debtor
notice at least ten days prior to the execution by registered mail.68 The creditor
also has to give notice to other creditors with security interests in the asset. The
notice needs to contain a description of the secured claims, the pledged assets, the
specifics of the sale and needs to mention the right of the debtor to redeem the
assets by satisfying the secured claim.
Pledger and pledgee can also agree on a forfeiture clause at the time of the
conclusion of the pledge contract or afterwards, even after the debtor defaulted.69
If the debtor defaults, the pledgee will become the owner of the pledged assets.
The asset must be valued by an expert on the day of the transfer of ownership. The
debtor, creditor or any interest party can apply for judicial review of the execution
at any stage of the execution.70
4.4 France
French law recognises pledge as a security right in movables. A distinction is made
between a possessory pledge, which requires the pledgee to gain control over the
movables, and a non-possessory pledge (gage), which requires apublic registration
in a Pledge Register.71 Apart from common pledges regulated by the Civil code, the
French Commercial code allows for the creation of so-called commercial pledges.
Commercial parties can create these non-possessory or possessory pledges on
assets such as agricultural equipment or stock. With regard to immovables, France
recognises the creation of a mortgage (hypotheque), which requires the registration
of the mortgage deed in a public register .72
64 Voorrechten en hypotheken OVH, Commentaar bij art. 46 Pandwel, vol 54, p. 47 (April 2015).
65 Art 47 Pandwet (or Book ffl, title XVII of the Belgian Civil Code).
66 OVH-Afl.54(23april2015),p. 66.
67 Art 51 Pandwet (or Book IH, title XVII of the Belgian Civil Code).
68 Art 48 Pandwet (or Book ffl, title XVII of the Belgian Civil Code).
69 Art 53 Pandwet (or Book III, title XVII of the Belgian Civil Code).
70 Art 54 and 56 Pandwet (or Book III, tifle XVII offhe Belgian Civil Code).
71 Art 2337 Cc. See Cf. Repertoire Dalloz de droit commercial, vol Gage commercial (January 2017).
72 Art 2416 Cc and 2426 Cc.
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The French Civil code does not allow for accelerated extrajudicial collateral
enforcement through public or private sale. Articles 2346 and 2347 Cc state: If the
debt secured is not paid, the creditor may seek a judicial order for the sale of the
thing pledged. This sale takes place according to the mles of civil procedure on
measures of enforcement from which a contract of pledge cannot derogate. The
creditor may also obtain a judicial order to the effect hat he thing will remain with
him as payment. When the value of the thing exceeds the amount of the secured
debt, the difference is paid to the debtor or, if there are other pledgee creditors, is
held in consigmnent. Articles 2458 and 2459 Cc have a similar content with regard
to the mortgage.
The French Civil code allows for accelerated extrajudicial collateral enforcement
though appropriation. Articles 2348 and 2459 recognise the use of a forfeiture
clause. Pledger and pledgee can agree on a forfeiture clause at the time of the
conclusion of the pledge contract or afterwards. If the debtor defaults, the pledgee
will become the owner of the pledged assets. The asset must be valued by an
expert, designated by amicable agreement or judicially, on the day of the transfer
of ownership.73 Any clause to the contrary is deemed unwritten.
The enforcement of some of the commercial pledges deviates from the Civil code
execution regime.74 Article L521-3 states that if payment is not made in the due
date, the creditor may, eight days after simple notice served on the debtor and any
third party holding a landlord's lien for rent, sell the articles held as security at
public auction.75 The provisions of articles L.322-9 to L.322-13 on public auctions
are applicable. Furthermore, two ways of recourse as regulatued by the Civil code
are available too. Firstly, the parties can agree upon a forfeiture clause in the
contract. Secondly, the creditor can ask for judicial attribution of the pledged asset.
4.5 Germany
Under German law, seciirity over movables can be granted in the form of a security
transfer (Sicherungsubereignung) from the collateral provider to the collateral
taker. The transfer of the movable does not necessarily require the transfer of
control over the movable.76
73 Art 2460
74 Art L527-8 states that enforcement of the pledge of stock is according to the enforcement regime of the Civil code.
75 The notice should be served by a Bailiff. See: Civ. 3 fevr. 1937, DH 1937. 165. Cf. (Le gage commercial. Rep.
Corn. Dalloz - Dimitri Houtcieff-janvier 2017, nr. 58 e.v.)
76 Cf. §929 and 930 BOB.
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The security transfer is not regulated in the German Civil Code (Burgerliches
Gesetzbuch; BGB). A general demarcation of the collateral taker's right o enforce
the collateral is lacking. It follows from case law that the enforcement of the
collateral takes primarily place in accordance with the security agreement between
the collateral taker and the collateral provider.77 Without any specific stipulation,
the collateral taker can choose to sell the movable either privately or publicly.
Enforcement through appropriation is only possible if agreed between the parties.78
In the interest of the collateral provider, the collateral taker must strive to achieve
the best possible recovery result.79 Unless agreed otherwise, there is no waiting
period or mandatory valuation prescribed for enforcing the collateral.
German law also recognises a pledge over movables (Pfandrecht an beweglichen
Sachen), although in practice the significance of this instrument is limited. This
relates to the requirement hat the pledger has to hand over the movable to the
pledger in order to create the pledge.80 The pledgee is entitled to sell the movable
when the secured obligation is not performed.81 Unless unfeasible, the pledgee
has to give notice to the pledger at least one month in advance of the sale of the
movable.82 However, parties can agree on a different waiting period.83 The sale
can be a public sale (§1235 BOB). The time and place of the auction have to be
announced publicly.84 The pledgee also has to inform the pledger (and others with
rights in the movable) of the public sale.85 However, pledger and pledgee can agree
otherwise on both the manner of sale as the communication thereof.86
German law does not allow for execution through a pre-agreed appropriation
clause. However, the pledgor and pledgee can agree that he pledger shall retain
movable towards satisfaction of the secured claim, provided that the debtor is
in default.87
Security over immovables can be granted in the form of a mortgage (either a
Hypothek or a Sicherungsgrundschuld). However, there is no option to realise
77 BOH 24.10.1979, NJW 1980, 226. See also MUKoBGB/Oechsler, Anh. § 929-936, Rn. 49 (2017).
78 BGH 24.10.1979, NTW 1980, 226.
79 BGH 05.10.1999, NJW 2000, 352. See also MliKoBGB/Oechsler, Anh. § 929-936, Rn. 51 (2017).
80 §1205 BOB.
81 §1228 BOB.
82 §1234 BOB.
83 §1245(1) BOB.
84 §1237(1) BOB.
85 §1237(2) BOB.
86 §1245(1) BOB. See also MiiKoBGB/Damrau § 1245, Rn. 1-7 (2017).
87 §1229 BOB. See also MuKoBGB/Damrau § 1229, Rn. 1-6 (2017).
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the immovable collateral out of court. The mortgagee has to enforce its collateral
through a court supervised proceeding (Zwangvollstreching).w
4.6 Austria
Austria recognises both pledge (Pfandrecht) and title transfer for security of
movables, but both security devices require publicity. The debtor must ransfer
control over the movable to the creditor.89 Movables which are not easily moved,
like big industrial machines, may be marked that hey are pledged or transferred
instead of a transfer of control. With regard to immovables, Austria recognises
the creation of a mortgage (Pfandrecht) which requires the registration of the
mortgage deed in a public register.90
The Austrian Civil code already allows for an accelerated extrajudicial collateral
enforcement with regard to the pledge of movables and the mortgage of
immovables.91 If the debtor is in default he secured creditor has the right o sell the
movable or immovable without prior court approval. For mortgage, parties need
to agree on the method of sale in the mortgage contract.92 For pledge, the Austrian
civil code contains a detailed set of rules.93 The sale is in principle a public sale.94
The creditor must give notice to the debtor at least one month prior to the sale and
mention the amount of the outstanding secured claim.95 He also has to notify other
creditors with security interests in the pledged asset. The creditor needs to notify
the debtor after the sale of the value of the proceeds.96
4.7 Conclusion on Impact
Of the researched countries, only France does not need to change its laws in
implementing the directive regarding AECE regimes. The French AECE by
means of appropriation is already in compliance with the proposed directive.
The other countries will need to change theirs laws, even though they already
have AECE regimes in place. The Dutch, Austrian, Belgian and German AECE
regimes do not comply with the proposed directive's requirements of a valuation
88 §1147 and §1192 BOB. See also MuKoBGB/Lieder § 1147, Rn. 1 and § 1192, Rn. 2 (2017).
89 §451 (1)ABGB;ECLI:AT:OGH0002:1954:RS0010394.
90 §451(1)ABGB.
91 The default option is judicial sale based op § 461 ABGB.
92 § 1_371 ABGB. See: ECLI:AT:OGH0002:1950:RS0032402. Cf. U Teriitza, 'Sicherungsrechte an Immobilien
in Europa: Landerbericht Osterreich', in: M Hinteregger & T Boric (eds), Sicherungsrechte an Immobilien m
Ewopa (Lit Verlag 2009) 247.
93 §466aABGB.
94 § 466b (2) and (3) ABGB
95 § 466b (1) ABGB.
96 § 466c (2) ABGB.
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by an independent valuer prior to the enforcement and a fixed reserve price. The
Netherlands need to add that parties can agree on an AECE before a debtor is the
debtor is in default in relation to the secured obligation and not just after, as it is
under present Dutch law. Furthermore, Belgium needs to introduce an extrajudicial
enforcement of collateral over immovables, since present Belgian mortgages are
enforced by a court-supervised sale of the mortgaged property.97
5 Appropriateness and Necessity
One can have doubts about he appropriateness and necessity of the proposed
framework for accelerated extrajudicial enforcement of collateral. It ought o
conta-ibute to the prevention of already existing NPLs,98 but that goal will not be
achieved with this part of the proposed directive. After all, the proposed AECE
options will not automatically be applicable to existing NPLs. The proposed AECE
options have to be agreed upon by creditor and debtor in advance. However, that a
debtor accepts such an adaptation of the agreement afterwards and thus expedites
the enforcement the collateral is far from obvious." In these cases, the collateral
has to be enforced in accordance with the already existing national enforcement
regimes.100 It is even not that obvious for creditors to propose the applicability of
the framework. In the case of collateral that can be enforced under Dutch, Ausfa^an,
Belgian and German law, the national aws on enforcement of collateral is in
various aspects more flexible. For example, Dutch, Austrian, Belgian and German
law do not have the obligatory intervention of a valuer, the tenn of execution is
for the most part shorter and there are no rules with regard to a minimum yield.
Furthermore, a harmonised extrajudicial execution mechanism will not be a
panacea for differences in the duration of enforcement procedures within Europe.
As far as the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Belgium are concerned,there
will probably not be an accelerated recovery of collateral over movables due to
the strict requirements in the proposal. In addition, the draft directive grants a
debtor the right o go to court for an alleged violation of the enforcement rules.101
It is not excluded that he court before which the case is brought, could order the
97 Art 1563 Ger.W.; art. 1626 Ger.W. The mortgagee can start he (judicial) sale without prior court approval
if the secured claim is established by the mortgage deed. See: Cass. (Iste Kamer) 17 november 1988, Pas.
1988, I, 303. Cf. H. Reghif, 'De tenuitvoerlegging van zakelijke zekerheidsrechten', in: X., Voorrechten en
hypotheken. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Capita selecta, 1 1 -59 (59
p.) (1 April 2006).
98 See Directive Proposal (n 2) 1-2.
99 Also: S Timmerman, F E J Beekhoven van den Boezem, 'De ontwerprichtlijn voor de aanpak van Non-Performing
Loans' (2018) 28 Tijdschrift voor Insolventierecht 184.
100 Existing enforcement mechanisms will not be replaced by the proposed AECE options, see preamble pt 40.
101 Directive Proposal (n 2) art 28. See farther art. 24 (4) under e for the challenge of the valuation of the collateral.
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suspension of the execution. In this respect he differences between Member States
may continue to exist and will affect he processing time for the enforcement.
The preamble of the proposal mentions that he existing enforcement procedures
within the Union sometimes result in a lack of level playing field with regard to
access to credit.102 However, because of the previously mentioned circumstances,
our expectation is that he harmonizing effect in these Member States will be small.
This expectation isstrengthened by the limited scope of the proposed irective. For
consumer loans, the proposed ways of extra-judicial execution cannot be agreed
upon. The directive proposal is limited in scope to loans to business debtors.103
Moreover, the proposed irective does not affect enforcement restrictions arising
from (pre-) insolvency proceedings, which will still be governed by national law.104
The position of a secured creditor during insolvency is thus not harmonised.
The aforementioned circumstances raise questions about whether the proposed
adjustments of national security rights are necessary. The proposed out-of-
court enforcement mles deviate from the existing enforcement regimes in the
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Austria. These legal systems (with the
exception of Belgium) already have extrajudicial means of execution of security
rights on movable and immovable property, even though the banks in their
jurisdiction have relatively few NPL's.105 The main advantage of the directive
seems to be the possibility for banks to agree on a more uniform and predicable
enforcement method of foreign (European) security rights. In addition, the directive
proposal gives Member-States the chance to add new ways ofAECE mechanisms
by transposing the directive.106
6 Concluding Remarks
Recent data show that he amount ofNPL's can decrease significantly even without
harmonisation f collateral enforcement. At the start of 2015, European banks had
more than   1 trillion NPLs on their balances. In the third quarter of 2018 that
amount had decreased with more than 40% to   627 billion (4,17% of the total
outstanding loans).107
Although it is likely that a harmonised secured transactions law will contribute
to the European business climate, the EU and its Member States should prefer a
balanced and well thought-out arrangement over a package of measures that might
seem hurried and insufficiently matured. The NPL problem creates momentum
for such a harmonisation but the question remains open whether it justifies the
introduction of the proposed mles, taking into account he limited effects for
existing NPL's.108
Harmonisation of enforcement of security rights could be desirable and possibly
inevitable in the long mn. However, very specific rules regarding every aspect of
enforcement do not seem appropriate. For example, the public communication
of the sale at least ten days prior and the obligatory valuation of the asset could
be omitted. Harmonisation should be limited to implementing some common
characteristics, uch as the option for parties to agree on an enforcement of security
rights without he need to obtain an enforceable title from the court.109
102 See Directive Proposal (n 2) preamble pt 42.
103 Idem, ait 2 (2).
104 Idem. art 32.
105 See: SWD/2018/075 - 2018/063 (COD) (Impact assessment) 5.
106 For example, AECE by way of appropriation i sofar this was impossible.
107 ECB Supervisory Banking Statistics (Q3 2018), October 2018: T04.02.2 Asset quality: non-performing
loans and advances by country (p. 60): https://www.bankmgsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.
supervisorybankingstatistics_third_quarter_2018_201901 .en.pdf.
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108 We nonetheless expect hat he tightening up ofpmdential supervision and the further development of a European
secondary market for NPL's have more potential to tackle NPL's.
109 At the moment of finalising this chapter, the Council has adopted its position on the Directive Proposal.
Negotiations on the Directive have been split into two work streams: (i) issues related to credit servicers and
credit purchasers, and (ii) issues related to the recovery of collateral. Titel V on AECE is not so far progressed
and no changes have been done. See for the current draft of the Directive Proposal, which does not contains the
original Titel V: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/documenVST-7344-2019-ADD-l/en/pdf.
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